On the 11th September 1981 police raided the laboratory of Edward Taub, a behavioural neuroscientist at the Institute for Behavioral Research (IBR) in Silver Spring, Maryland. Responding to accusations of animal cruelty, law enforcement officers removed seventeen macaque monkeys. A prolonged confrontation followed, fought in private and public arenas for over a decade, transforming seventeen hitherto unknown laboratory animals into household names: the "Silver Spring Monkeys." These events were a pivotal moment in the birth of the modern animal rights movement. 1 The raid was orchestrated by a recently established animal advocacy group, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), which subsequently grew to become a global force in animal rights. 2 Less acknowledged, though equally significant, was the impact on Taub and scientific understanding of the brain. Taub never again worked with animals. Instead, he adapted what he had learned with monkeys to produce innovative new treatments for stroke induced illness in humans. This work was based on a radical new understanding of the brain's capacity for change now widely known as neuroplasticity evidence for which was a serendipitous outcome of the Silver Spring monkeys' unexpected longevity caused by their removal from the laboratory and subsequent legal limbo. Most importantly, the decade-long debate over the Silver Spring monkeys transformed public discourse on animal research and contributed to significant reform of the regulatory framework in the USA.
The Silver Spring monkeys are conventionally understood to represent the enduring conflict between the values of science and society, human need and animal rights. Without disputing this interpretation, or the significance of the Silver Springs monkeys for revitalizing the American animal advocacy movement, this article proposes a less polarised reading. It resists an explanatory frame based on societal demand for the imposition of animal care in its absence. Instead, this account explores how conflicting approaches to caring for and understanding the welfare of laboratory animals lay at the heart of the controversy. Older approaches to animal care conflicted with and were eventually superseded by newer practices grounded in considerably wider matters of concern. Bringing these interactions to the fore reveals the historically situated and complex ways in which cultural, societal and scientific values interact to drive change within the public perception, practice and governance of animal research.
The Silver Spring monkey controversy was a moment where two historically distinctive regimes of valuing and caring for laboratory animals conflicted. We might think of these "regimes" as distinct examples of cultures of care. In recent years, theorizing "care" has become a focal point in the sociological study of science. Friese's characterization of "care as science" is one example of a growing interest in the analysis of care. 3 Here, Friese shows how animal care has become linked to the successful "translation" of animal research to human benefits within contemporary biomedical science. 4 Characteristic of recent theorizations of care is the move away from understanding care as a form of normative ethics. Instead, care is shown to be situated, multiple and emergent in the materialized doing of science. For Puig de la Bellacasa care is dependent on a relational ecology. It requires "knowledge and curiosity regarding the needs of an 'other' -human or not -and these become possible through relating, through refusing objectification". Human and animal become mutually constitutive of the other through situated relational processes as care "inevitably transforms the entangled beings." 5 For historians, these theorized accounts of care are useful because to be situated is to be historically constituted. Accordingly, care can only be properly understood within its historical context. As a concept, care can thereby provide an analytic bridge between the historical and sociological study of animal research. 6 The two conflicting cultures of care at the centre of the Silver Spring monkey controversy are products of different though closely related periods of time. The first and historically earlier culture of care, dominant from the early twentieth century through to the 1960s, framed care as an instrumental tool subservient to the needs of the experimental system. The lead scientist was usually responsible for animal care and often managed their own animal house and laboratory (as opposed to centralized shared facilities). The first part of this article describes how Taub came to embody this ethos. Early in his career, Taub trained as a behaviourist displaying little interest in the internal mental lives of animals. Monkeys were surgically transformed into highly specialized biomedicalized bodies. Animal care was understood in relation to biological health and absence of physiological pain. However, as Taub's research developed, the canvas of concerns shaping animal care broadened. Taub gradually recognised the epistemological importance of his monkeys' emotional and affective states. He gradually moved away from radical behaviourism which in turn expanded the boundaries of his culture of care. Reconstructing this process reveals how Taub's experimental system generated specific forms of curiosity about laboratory monkeys that gave shape to situated care practices.
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However, throughout, new matters of concern emerged only in relation to and as an effect of experimental need and the trajectory of scientific research.
The second part of the article moves to the events following the 1981 raid. It explores how the seizure of the Silver Spring Monkeys exposed Taub's working practices to an emergent culture of care which presumed a much broader canvass for understanding the needs of laboratory animals. Within this regime, animal care was a specialised and diversified body of expertise. Responsibility was dispersed amongst an eclectic specialist community dedicated to animal care where veterinary expertise was particularly predominant. 7 Within this broader approach to laboratory animal care new forms of knowledge were considered viable tools for shaping laboratory animal care. This included veterinary medicine, zoology, ethology, evolutionary theory and anthropomorphic reasoning. This alternate culture of care shared many commonalities with Taub's yet encompassed very different reference points. For instance, both incorporated a concern for the social and psychological wellbeing of animals. However, the former assumed animal welfare was a concern in and of itself understood through reference to animal species and behaviour in nature. Consequently the species specific needs of animals in the wild could inform the needs of animals in the laboratory. Whereas Taub believed his laboratory animals to be unique beings with highly specialist needs comprehensible only through reference to the experimental system. For Taub, "nature" was indirectly if at all relevant to provision of care in the laboratory. Taub's culture of care began with the experimental system and worked outward allowing matters of concern to emerge as they were found to have epistemological relevance. The differences between these two approach to a culture of care were revealed in the courts, congressional hearings, the institutional deliberations of the National Institutes of Health, media coverage and within wider public discourse, following the 1981 seizure of the silver spring monkeys. Taub's approach was challenged and eventually superseded by a culture of care which gave much more importance to the perceived needs of the animal as understood through reference to behavioural needs in nature. In this way the legacy of the Silver Spring monkey controversy was the broadening of matters of concern which made up an acceptable culture of care within animal research laboratories. 8
Care as a moral economy of science?
Edward Taub arrived at Columbia University (NY) in 1956 driven by a fascination with experimental psychology and the then in vogue behaviourism. William "Nat" Schoenfeld and Fred Simmons Keller had established the first undergraduate course in behaviourism at Columbia in in 1947. 9 Here, Taub learnt sophisticated experimental techniques such as operant conditioning (the modification of an organism's behaviour through positive and negative reinforcement which presupposed behaviour to be a reflex response to a stimulus). He also absorbed the behaviourist refusal to consider internal motivational states such as will, emotion or mind as adequate scientific explanations for behaviour. 10 had absorbed the language of reflexology. 13 Reflexology explained behaviour in terms of a response to a physical environmental factor (i.e. stimulating a sensory nerve triggered a motor nerve eliciting a response). As an explanatory device, reflexology allowed behaviourist to account for complex behaviour without presupposing ephemeral internal states such as will or mind. Accordingly, Taub's proposal to apply behaviourist techniques to confirm Sherringtonian reflexology was far from controversial (even if his ability to do so was at the time quite unique). Whilst replication would be no more than a footnote within neurophysiology, association with a well-established neurophysiological principle would provide behaviorism significant credibility as an experimental science. In any case, the doctoral project was primarily to establish Taub's capacity to design and conduct novel experimental research. Confirmation of Sherringtonian reflexology would in turn confirm Taub's ability as a scientist. It was, therefore, something of a blow that Taub's data departed wildly from expectation.
Using standard behaviourist techniques Taub began by conditioning monkeys to avoid an electric shock by flexing a forelimb in response to an auditory stimulus. He then subjected the animals to deafferentation. Successful deafferentation was a highly skilful surgical technique which Taub patiently learned at the Isaac Albert Research Institute. It required the meticulous severing of sensory nerves in a limb so as to remove the capacity for somatic feeling whilst leaving motor nerves intact. Following deafferentation, Taub expected each animal to fail to move their arm in response to the auditory stimulus thereby confirming Sherringtonian reflexology. Initially, all went to plan. During a recovery period following surgery each monkey's deafferented limb hung loosely and unused. Only the normal limb was employed to aid movement, climbing and eating just as Sherrington and Mott had described. However, drawing on the behaviourist commitment to the absolute removal of mind from an experimental scenario, Taub introduced an improvement to the original experimental design to rule out the possibility than an animal "chose" not to use the deafferented arm. He introduced a physical restraint on the monkey's normal forelimb to prevent its use during the conditioning experiment. Taub was shocked to see monkeys move their deafferented arm with uniform consistency once their "normal" limb was restrained. 14 At the same time, Taub's unconventional work was beginning to be associated with a new and equally unconventional understanding of the brain known as neuroplasticity. This held that the brain could adapt its functions in the course of an organism's life (for instance in response to injury). Neuroplasticity was controversial and widely dismissed in favour of the long established belief that the adult brain was fixed. An extensive 1967 review sceptically suggested that "inadequate technique rather than 'plasticity' of the brain" may account for recent criticisms of the fixity of brain function. 17 Taub had not yet explicitly located his work within "neuroplasticity" as he did not believe he had conclusively demonstrated such a phenomenon. Nevertheless, the direction of travel implicit to his work was clear to others. In 1968, Taub published an overview of his research framed as a defence but also a fundamental critique of the assumption that sensory information was required for movement. In addition to 15 Taub had not completed the final exam for Schoenfeld's course. Normal procedure was to award a student an "incomplete" and enter a mark once the exam had been taken. Instead, Schoenfeld failed Taub due to his "insolence." Taub later recalled Schoenfeld appeared "very angry" following "a public debate on the relevance of my research to his theory … he walked out." Quoted in Caroline Fraser, "The Raid at Silver Spring," New Yorker, refuting Sherringtonian reflexology, Taub extended his critique to the behaviourist exclusion of the mind from science. Adopting a more combative tone, Taub argued that the behaviourist commitment to Sherringtonian reflexology was no more than "a sort of glue to hold a number of learning theories together on what appeared to be empirical grounds, in the face of apparently contradictory evidence." 18 This was a disingenuous commitment designed to circumvent an appeal to mind. In contrast, Taub suggested that movement without somatic input was:
clearly a type of thinking by any worthwhile definition … deafferentation research offers one type of window into the processes by virtue of which the CNS [central nervous system] achieves autonomy; by virtue of which the organism thinks. 19 Taub was now tearing down a fundamental philosophical tenet of behaviourism. In concluding that "the concept of self-produced or voluntary movement must now be exhumed and re-examined experimentally" he reintroduced internal motivation as a legitimate object of inquiry for the behavioural sciences. 20
Acknowledging nonhuman sentience did not, however, introduce new moral values or ethical practices. Monkeys had emerged as thinking beings within Taub's experimental system as a consequence of his experimental epistemology. For Taub, the value of deafferented monkeys lay in their function within the experimental system. However, this does not mean that their welfare was not a concern. On the contrary, the health and welfare of deafferented monkeys was critically important. Taub's monkeys were created through substantial investment of time, money and high levels of surgical skill. Each monkey was individually cared for in large part due to their being a unique form of life designed to fulfil specific experimental functions within the laboratory. As unique partly manufactured forms of life, deafferented monkeys required highly specialised forms of care which evolved in relation to the experimental system. When Taub began a new line of inquiry in the 1970s, for instance, seeking to understand whether sensation was necessary for a developing organism to learn movement, the new experimental system allowed new matters of care to emerge. Hitherto, Taub had worked with adult animals. Now, he deafferented monkeys on birth prior to any life experience. By 1975, Taub had perfected highly specialized foetal neurosurgery techniques to conduct deafferentation in the womb prior to birth. Creating animals that had never experienced somatic sensation yet developed motor capacity equal to "normal" animals by the age of 3 months undermined any claim that sensation was a necessary component of movement.
Foetal surgery had a high level of mortality with over half of the animals dying. 21 Those monkeys that survived had heightened value as research objects. Once subjected to long periods of training and conditioning, their value was enhanced even further as they became integral parts of an experimental system that would be difficult and costly to replace. The unique bodily and behavioural characteristics which made the monkeys integral to the Taub's experimental system helped constituted increased concern for their care and welfare. Neurosurgery, for instance, required the prevention of head movement with the standard method being restraint by means of screws surgically implanted in the skull. 22 However, restraining screws posed a serious post-operative threat of infection that could undermine the long-range studies which Taub intended. Consequently, surgical interventions were minimized as they placed the animal at a risk "more than is desired for animals made especially valuable by either long training or successful recovery from life-endangering procedures." 23 Taub worked to develop nonsurgical methods of head restraint. An initial possibility was the construction of individualised tight fitting helmets but this was abandoned in favour of a mechanical restrain system that held the head in place. In examples such as this, where Taub worked to improve his experimental techniques so as to minimize the risk they posed to a monkey's health and welfare, we can see the dynamic relationship between experimental practice and animal care. The overriding ethos was instrumental. The reference points for this culture of care evolved from the dynamic interplay of changing experimental needs and those of the monkey's welfare. The ultimate goal being to ensure the experimental system worked.
Similar interplay can be found throughout Taub's animal care and husbandry practices. As well as extending his research programme further back into the life of an animal, Taub also expanded his deafferentation investigations across the monkey's body. Under Sherringtonian reflexology there had been no reason to apply deafferentation to more than one limb. However, if desensitised limbs could be used new research questions followed such as how an animal might respond to loss of sensation in multiple limbs? Building out from "simple" deafferentation of a single limb to bilateral deafferentation of multiple limbs constituted a new experimental programme that introduced a range of new challenges requiring new approaches to animal care. Post-surgical recovery times, for example, were significantly lengthened as during the first two weeks following bilateral deafferentation a monkey's limbs were virtually useless. it took up to six months for full movement to return. 24 During this period monkeys required "[e]xtensive nursing care … frequently including daily bandaging and passive exercise." As movement returned the animals required more not less care because:
[d]eafferented monkeys have a tendency to sustain severe damage to their affected extremities, frequently as the result of self-mutilation and sometimes simply because the lack of sensation eliminates a warning system signalling when the danger of injury is imminent. 25 One of the most common acts of self-mutilation was for a monkey to chew digits on deafferented limbs. This risked infection but equally undermined their ability to complete standardized tests of precision movement. 26 Here again, animal welfare concerns were entangled with the needs of the experimental system. Care served the needs of science as much as those of the animal because the: extent to which an individual animal exhibits movements following deafferentation will, of course, depend on the degree to which its limbs have escaped injury. To estimate maximal function, it is necessary to observe only those animals with essentially undamaged extremities. 27 Another example is found in the tendency of deafferented animals to be far more sensitive to unseen and unexpected changes in the environment. Consequently, greater attention was applied to shaping their living space and their emotional wellbeing. Taub explained that when: a deafferented animal is calm and ambulating slowly its movements may sometimes approximate those of a normal animal. However, when the animal becomes excited, as in trying to escape from an experimenter, the coordination tends to become degraded. 28 In this way affective states emerged as matters of care. Managing the entanglement of animal welfare, animal emotion, experimental need and the relationship between human and monkey in the experimental encounter was at the heart of Taub's culture of care. As such, we might think of Taub's practice as an example of a moral economy of science.
Borrowed from the social historian E. P. Thomson, the proposition of a moral economy of science has been variously developed for different ends within the history of science. shape scientific practice whilst simultaneously tracing the conservative features which regulate and systematize scientific communities. 29 However, Lorraine Daston has proposed a difference sense of moral economy. For Daston, the moral economy of science encompasses the "web of affect-saturated values that stand and function in well-defined relationship to one another." 30 This includes the subjective and affective elements which are integral to scientific epistemology at a certain time and place but are not explicitly recognised as such. By emphasising the central role of emotional and affective experience in the production of scientific knowledge, Daston's concept of the moral economy of science allows the consideration of care within historical accounts of the epistemology of experimental science.
Accordingly, the way in which Taub managed the complex interrelationships of epistemological and welfare concerns, manifest in his scientific and animal care practices, produced a situated culture of care bounded by the needs of the experimental system that can be understood as a Dastonian moral ecology of science. Its reference point was primarily epistemological: matters of concern became such when they were linked to experimental need. The emotional life of animals (an almost heretical subject for a behaviourist) emerged when Taub recognised that calm monkeys could ambulate near to normal without injuring themselves whereas an excited or agitated animal lost such control posing a danger to themselves (and the continuation of experimental work). This entangled process illustrates the situated, emergent and relational characteristic of care practice. Rather than a set of normative values embedded in ethical and regulatory practice, within the animal dependent experimental sciences care is highly situational -an emergent practice which co-develops over time in relations to other factors not least epistemological and experimental needs. One had to know each monkey intimately, how to approach them and how to engage so as to maintain their sense of calm. Each monkey was to this extent an individual but also part of a collective, a co-contributor to their own experience of life in the laboratory. For Haraway, embodied care practices of "becoming with" such as these are equally forms of "becoming worldly"; processes that recognise relating with others to be transformative acts of constructive world building. 31 In a similar way, for Taub experimental system and monkey were mutually constituted in the doing of his research. Accordingly, Taub's culture of care was bounded by the experimental system. Taub firmly believed that his monkeys were a laboratory product of experimental science. So much so he failed to see how knowledge derived from the same species in a "natural" setting could be relevant to their care and welfare. 
Care as a political ecology of science?
In the late summer of 1981 Taub was on vacation having entrusted the care of his research monkeys to Alex Pacheco, a young student who had volunteered to work in Taub's laboratory earlier in the year. Pacheco had spoken passionately of his desire to build a career as a research scientist. However, he was actually an active animal rights campaigner and co-founder of the recently established People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). In Taub's absence Pacheco invited five "experts" in animal welfare into the facility to assess the monkeys. Michael W. Fox, Donald Barnes, Geza Teleki, John McArdle and Ronnie Hawkin were carefully selected for their experience but also for their known sympathy for and connections to animal advocacy organisations. 32 Each was asked to comment on the state of seventeen laboratory monkeys who subsequently became the "Silver Spring monkeys." Highly critical signed affidavits were prepared condemning the laboratory as "extremely filthy" and asserting that the "animals appeared unhealthy, and evidenced a lack of veterinary care." 33 When passed to the local law enforcement they triggered the police raid and removal of all seventeen monkeys accompanied by almost immediate media coverage. The speed at which informed and graphic media reports appeared suggests that the public imagination was purposefully targeted as part of a wider strategy to change socio-political thinking on animal research. Well briefed journalists described how County police "found monkeys that were in such physical and mental stress that the animals appeared to have bitten off their fingers and arms." 34 welfare organisation. Taub spoke of his concern for the animals' welfare offering a reward for their return fearing that they "may be killed with the excuse that this was for their own good." 35 The animals were eventually returned when it became apparent that the monkeys constituted key evidence without which a prosecution was impossible.
Within the media and wider public discourse, the institutional deliberations of the NIH, the legal case and congressional hearings, Taub was accused of wanton cruelty and a failure to provide adequate care for his animals. PETA worked to amplify this accusation by depicting the monkeys as "victims" and the regulatory system as unfit for purpose. Graphic evidence was distributed which simultaneously humanised the animals (e.g. through attribution of personal names) whilst vividly describing their suffering. A monkey named "Sisyphus", for instance, was described as having been "forced to eat food contaminated with his own faecal matter and urine in order to survive." 36 Taub disputed such claims believing not unreasonably that he was the victim of a sting. 37 During his vacation the two staff employed to clean, maintain and care for the monkey colony rooms alongside Pacheco were absent for seven of the fourteen days.
Over the preceding two years the same staff had been absent for only three days. This was never adequately explained though Taub noted that Pacheco's "observers" (he refused to acknowledge their "expertise") had each visited on one of the absentee days. When asked if Taub believed he had been set up Taub's response was that the statistical likelihood of the absentee record being "due to chance was only eight times in 10 billion" but "probability is proof for scientists, but not in a court of law." 38
Behind the language of cruelty lay a more nuanced procedural critique grounded in a culture of care quite different to the moral economy of science that Taub had developed during his thirty year career. The scientific, legal, institutional, and political arguments over the Silver Spring monkeys, conducted in the private and public domain, operated as a platform to advance a culture of care that valued the animal in and of itself. This perspective brought with it a much broader canvass of concerns raising new questions as to who had the appropriate expertise to interpret the health and welfare needs of the Silver Spring monkeys. Taub claimed that as the lead research scientist he and he alone had the expertise, experience and authority to understand and provide for the needs of what were highly specialised laboratory animals. 35 Opposing this view was a broad collective of animal advocates, veterinarians and NIH officials who subscribed to what might be described as a humanitarian veterinary perspective. This latter culture of care placed value on bodily health as well as the social, psychological and holistic needs of animals. It encompassed a range of expertise including veterinary medicine, ethology, psychology and zoology. Most importantly, it took the experience of animals in wild and captive sites as the starting point for understanding animal welfare in captivity.
Contrary to Taub, all five signatories of original affidavits prioritised the "natural" behaviour of animals over their artificial experience in the laboratory environment. Each had expertise and experience working with and meeting the needs of non-human primates but none had any specialist knowledge of deafferentation. Taub's defence rested on the unique status of the Silver Spring monkeys as animals that had evolved within an artificial experimental system and could only be understood in the context of deafferentation. Their physiological and behavioural needs were distinctive due to having been surgically altered at a young age (or even prior to birth). On these grounds, Taub rejected the relevance of the scientific credentials of his critics going so far as to discount veterinarians appointed by the NIH as lacking the experience to adequately care for the Silver Spring monkeys.
These different approaches to cultures of care in the laboratory were made visible when Taub stood trial before Judge Stanley Klavan between 27th October and 23rd November 1981. Taub was accused of 119 counts of animal cruelty. Graphic imagery and film was marshalled by Roger Galvin, prosecuting assistant state's attorney, displaying monkeys whose limbs bore multiple open and healed scars. Some lacerations were bandaged but several open wounds had no indication of dressings. According to the prosecution it was clear that the animals "suffered unnecessary pain." 39 Noting the absence of a record of "regular visits … necessary for vets to take a look at the animals" Galvin also asserted that the "monkeys received no veterinary care" likely to reduce the economic cost of proper care (though there was no evidence to support such a supposition). 40 To the lay eye it was difficult to interpret these images as anything but neglect bordering on cruelty. Veterinary witnesses for the prosecution saw the same, adding in their expert testimony that the open wounds laced animals at a considerable risk of infection. The prosecution had no doubt that the monkeys had been deprived of veterinary care and as a result experienced considerable and unnecessary suffering.
Taub disputed all the accusations against him. What appeared to be cruelty in lay eyes was actually the result of the misrepresentation and misunderstanding of a highly complex scientific endeavour. His accusers were wrong in their interpretation of the state of his monkeys because they drew on anthropomorphic analogies with human suffering mixed with comparison to "normal" non-human primate behaviour. Neither reference point was relevant to deafferented monkeys. Much later, Taub was similarly challenged when an interviewer displayed a film showing one of Taub's monkeys propelling himself uncertainly across the floor using a deafferented arm. Taub explained:
[t]hat is not a sad monkey … A monkey is not a human being; the expressions on a monkey's face are not interpretable in the same way as the expression on the face of a human being. Both Pacheco and Newkirk have had experience with monkeys, and they know that that expression was not sadness. In one of the other photos they always point to, the expression on the monkey's face looks forlorn-if that monkey were a human being, you'd say he was sad-but that expression is not plaintive. That's a monkey before he's going to be fed. He purses out his lips and goes "woo woo woo." 41 At trial Taub made similar points and consistently emphasised that his monkeys had to be understood in the context of his research programme. It was physiologically impossible to feel anything in deafferented limbs. Physiologically, deafferentation rendered animals incapable of pain. It was nonsense, therefore, to speak of cruelty. Such language revealed the inability of non-specialists to understand and interpret the highly contextualised welfare needs of laboratory animals. Deafferented monkeys could only be properly understood by those with intimate knowledge of both the deafferentation procedure and how an individual monkey has responded to it. In sum, Taub argued that only he could adequately provide for their needs in line with his longstanding culture of care. The consulting veterinarian who sat on the IBR's Animal Care Committee, Paul Hildebrandt, confirmed Taub's claims stating that his training as a pathologist afforded him "little experience with research animals of any sort or with primates in or out of the laboratory." 42 Clinical veterinarians were not qualified to care for deafferented animals as they had no understanding or experience of their needs or their place within experimental science. Veterinary expertise was suitable in many environments, including the livestock industry, zoological gardens and wider society when dealing with companion animals. However, within the specialist world of Taub's laboratory veterinary knowledge alone was an insufficient resource to adequately understanding the care and welfare needs of deafferented monkeys. was anonymously passed to Taub revealing that Nero's infection was under control at the time of amputation and there was no evidence of osteomyelitis. 49 The report was inexplicably absent from the "complete" medical records that had been provided to Taub by the NIH for the purpose of mounting his appeal. Yet both Renquist and the prosecuting assistant state's attorney had access to the information. 50
Very few veterinarians had experience with deafferentation but one who did was
The management of Nero illustrates the complexity and confusion that proliferated about how to adequately provide for the care and welfare of deafferented animals. At the NIH, Renquist consulted John Leo Doppman of the Diagnositic Radiology Department on 27 th October 1981. Doppman reasoned that Nero's limb should be removed as "human limbs without pain sensation often suffer dislocations or fractures and that repaired joints or fractures are usually reinjured" therefore it was "only a liability to the animal." 51 Taub, still the legal owner, refused consent believing a more conservative treatment was appropriate emphasising again that the deafferented limb was essential to his experimental programme. Appealing to James Stunkard, a court appointed veterinarian tasked with ensuring the monkeys welfare, led to two NIH neurologists (Drs. Kafta and Sawaya) and an orthopaedic surgeon (Dr. McGown) being consulted. Like Doppman their reference point was human medicine though they reached different conclusions. Given that a human hand would be treated conservatively with debridement and antibiotics due to "the psychological significance of a hand to a human patient" they sided with Taub albeit for different reasons. 52 For Doppman and the four NIH veterinarians, Nero was conceived as an animal and therefore could be deprived of his limb. For Kafta, Sawaya and McGowan, Nero was treated as a human and so efforts should be made to preserve the limb. For Taub, depriving Nero of his limb was unthinkable. Motivated by a mixture of his intimate knowledge of Nero, his experience of the impact of deafferentation, as well as the necessity of maintaining Nero's integrity if the animal was to continue to contribute to his research programme, Taub ruled out amputation. In the absence of consensus on what was best for Nero no action was taken. From the 29 th October to 1 st November Nero was treated conservatively. However, by the 1 st November a large area of the hand had become necrotic. Taub had been warned that his refusal to consent to amputation was "against the advice of veterinary doctors" and reminded that if Nero was to die "there might be publicity over it" that would be damaging at trial. 53 learned the amputation was unnecessary. Autopsy of the removed limb revealed that at the time of amputation the infection had been brought under control. Necrotic damage was the result of bandaging applied too tightly cutting off circulation resulting from poor veterinary care at the NIH. Nero had lost an arm not because of events experienced in Taub's laboratory.
Taub's twenty-four years of experience working with deafferented laboratory primates counted for nothing in the face of the perceived authority of veterinary knowledge to determine animal care and welfare. This remained so even when veterinary intervention caused more harm than good. In practice, NIH veterinarians often found "standard veterinary practice" did not provide "entirely satisfactory" care for the Silver Spring monkeys. 54 On consultation with Taub, they often adopted many of his techniques for caring for deafferented animals. Nevertheless, publically they remained critical and it seemed at least to Taub negative welfare outcomes were routinely ascribed to treatment under his care when often they had been caused by inappropriate veterinary care.
When Taub began his research career in the 1950s the principle scientist was by default the ultimate authority on the care of animals related to their experimental work. It was common for scientists to have their own animal houses managed to their own standards of husbandry and welfare. Centralized animal facilities developed in part as a managerial response to increased external regulation. From the 1960s, animal research developed in the USA was principally governed by two separate but interrelated Federal regimes (in additional to varying state laws). One, enforced by the United Stated Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the 1966 Animal Welfare Act, established standards of care for animals destined for use in scientific research. Another, which evolved within and was enforced by the Public Health Service (PHS), compelled federally funded scientists to commit to standards of practice in the care and welfare of laboratory animals. Both regulatory processes were well established by 1981 though Taub appeared relatively uninformed on either. Taub had been shielded from these significant shifts in regulatory practice as a result of working at a small private research facility. In any case, the 1966 Animal Welfare Act had explicitly stopped short of establishing any regulatory framework for animals during experimentation. Its focus was on the production, provision and transportation of animals that were to be used in experimental science as well as their husbandry and care prior to use. Arthur G. Perry, a USDA veterinarian who under the Animal Welfare Act had inspected Taub's laboratory as recently as the 13 th July 1981 explained at Taub's trial that "when you inspect research facilities, there are a number of restrictions that are imposed upon the type of inspection that we can make." 55 In contrast to inspecting an animal breeder or dealer where every aspect of the business could be questioned at a research facility one did not investigate how animals were used during experiment. In any case, Perry's report showed the animals "appeared normal" after a thorough assessment of their alertness. Their coats. Whether they appeared comfortable … Whether they are sick, lame, blind, diseased, any of those characteristics. In relation to those animals on that particular day … I passed that the veterinary care was adequate. 56
When challenged on his knowledge of regulatory responsibility Taub responded that it was "somebody else's business to be aware of the regulations, not the lab's." 57 Evidently Taub was not just ill-informed on their nature but considered them to outside the purview of his responsibility. This was an antiquated view at the time though not unusual as animal research regulations had evolved after Taub and many established scientists had begun their research careers. Nevertheless, as far as the USDA was concerned, Taub's laboratory was operating within regulatory expectations.
In contrast to the Animal Welfare Act, PHS regulations engaged more closely with experimental work. A pre-requisite of PHS funding, for example, was to provide written assurance of a commitment to practices as laid out in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.
The PHS regulatory framework operated through a mix of formal and informal expectations governing the relationship of institution to the PHS as opposed to standards enforced by federal law. Carbone has usefully distinguished federal legislation as "top down" having been "thrust upon the scientific community" and the Guide "bottom up" responding to the needs of the research community by enacting standards of care through "flexible self-regulation." 58 Published in 1963, the first edition of the Guide was developed by an independent organisation by veterinarians seeking to improve laboratory animal husbandry known as the Animal Care Panel. Subsequent editions were produced by the National Research Council's Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources. It was revised in 1965, 1968, 1972 and 1978 with each edition placing greater emphasis on veterinary expertise. Importantly, whereas Animal Welfare Act regulations had the status of law those within the Guide (as implied in the name) did not. It communicated best practice assuming an ethos of self-regulation and trust. The Guide was initially advisory but compliance increasingly became expected. the Guide had to be considered a mandatory expectation departure from which had serious consequence (as opposed to an informal set of principles to be adapted to the needs of an experimental programme). 59 As a result, the independence of principle scientists to interpret the welfare needs of their laboratory animals was partially curtailed in favour of veterinary expertise and the prioritisation of the needs of animals in and of themselves.
For the NIH, failure to provide adequate veterinary care was judged to be serious. So much so that suspension quickly moved to termination. Prior to the site visit to Taub's laboratory the NIH committee had reviewed the evidence against Taub by speaking with local law enforcement and Maryland Assistant State's Attorney. The subsequent report gave considerable weight to the five affidavits collected by Pacheco as well as medical reports produced after the monkeys were taken into police custody by Janis Ott (clinical veterinarian from Brookfield Illinois zoo) and Phillip Robinson (clinical veterinarian from San Diego zoo). Ott and Robinson asserted that "veterinary care available to animals sustaining injuries to deafferented limbs was not sufficient to meet their medical needs and that the medical care in general provided for this colony was inadequate." 60 This appeared to the NIH to confirm nonadherence to the Guide. However, Taub contended that as the then current Guide stated that "[a]dequate veterinary care should be provided by a veterinarian qualified by doctoral training … or pertinent experience" the apparent absence of veterinary expertise did not equate to an absence of care. 61 Taub maintained that reference to pertinent experience allowed for scenarios where expertise in specialist animals should stand in the stead of veterinary qualification. Should not his twentyfour years working with nonhuman primates, as well as a unique understanding of the singular nature of deafferented animals, qualify as pertinent experience to provide adequate veterinary care? Taub's reading reflected a much earlier performative ethos that had shaped the Guide where a degree of latitude existed as to how general principles and standards were best enacted at the institutional level. The NIH, however, took a more literal position in claiming that a qualified veterinary professional was required. This led to the termination of his grants and effectively ended Taub's career in animal research.
In February 1984, a Health and Human Services (HHS) Departmental Grant Appeals Board favoured Taub's interpretation noting that: after many years of working with primates the PI [Principal Investigator] probably had acquired considerable general knowledge about the animals and their care … although the NIH veterinarians criticized the PI's treatment of certain problems, they adopted some of the PI's techniques, after consulting with the PI on several occasions while the monkeys were in their custody, and that their own The HHS appeals board also made clear that "no evidence monkeys were harmed by lack of veterinary supervision, or that the condition of the monkeys showed inadequate veterinary care" -an observation that had been lost during the original NIH investigation. 63 For Taub this was a pyrrhic victory. The HHS appeals board endorsed Taub's ability to care for the monkeys and found no indication the animals had suffered unduly. However, it nevertheless upheld the NIH's right to terminate Taub's grant. In August of the previous year the Court of Appeals of Maryland had reversed the single remaining conviction of having failed to provide veterinary care for Nero on the grounds that the Maryland Code did not apply to medical research. By 1984 Taub had cleared his name but this did very little to restore his reputation. Nor did it result in the restoration of NIH support for his research.
In 1981 Taub was caught out of step with wider shifts in the culture of laboratory animal care as well as public expectations of those engaged in animal research. Taub's argument that by virtue of his experience he was uniquely and better qualified than clinical veterinarians to care for deafferented animals proved unconvincing in large part to due to political necessity. 64 The NIH had also been caught off guard with upcoming congressional hearings addressing animal research it was eager to be seen as "a proper steward of public funds." 65 In seeking to distance itself from Taub, without explicitly supporting the accusations of cruelty against him, the NIH unintentionally located itself closer to his critics than his supporters. David Rioch, chair of the IBR's Animal Care Committee, believed that the NIH was too eager to follow the lead of veterinarians sympathetic to animal advocacy politics who were "applying human expectations of pain to animal surgery [which was] inappropriate because pain is primarily a matter of societal conditioning to which animals are not subject." 66 The inelegant response of the NIH repeatedly erred in favour of what we might call the humanitarian veterinary perspective. In the face of evidence that the absence of professional veterinary expertise had had no impact on the welfare of animals and that its introduction in several instances caused harms the NIH nevertheless prioritised veterinary authority when it came to laboratory animal care.
In doing so, the NIH mobilised similar forms of veterinary expertise that had been set against Taub by animal advocacy groups. In contrast, veterinarians such as the USDA inspector, Perry, were relatively educated in, and willing to accommodate the needs of, experimental research within their estimation of appropriate care and welfare. In cross examination, Perry revealed he had developed an interest in Taub's deafferentation research as it stood out from more routine toxicity testing and appeared to be "of real historical significance in the field of medicine." 67 In contrast, Janis Ott and Phillip Robinson were veterinarians familiar with primates, respectively of Brookfield (Illinois) and San Diego zoos. Both had been drawn into the Silver Spring monkey episode by PETA. They conducted examinations with little to no familiarity with Taub's scientific research and in the absence of any knowledge of deafferented animals. In justifying the decision to suspend and later terminate Taub's grants the NIH committee put on record that Taub's "lack of care is further evidenced by the examination report prepared by Drs Ott and Robinson" thereby validating the argument against Taub. 68 The NIH failed to distinguish between veterinarians who had long worked within the animal research community and had become accustomed to its practices and those whose expertise was based on experience of entirely different contexts.
Taking seriously the normative standpoints of veterinarians working in zoos and ethologists observing animals in nature meant prioritising the needs of the animals as a member of its species over the needs of an experimental system. Ott and Robinson interpreted the experience of the Silver Spring monkeys through reference to their experience of captive animals in zoos, knowledge of non-human behaviour in nature and loose anthropomorphic reasoning. So too did Michael W. Fox, Donald Barnes, Geza Teleki, John McArdle and Ronnie Hawkin in the original affidavits that had been passed to the local law enforcement. In taking these interpretations seriously, arguably more seriously than USDA veterinarians and Taub himself, the NIH inadvertently gave credibility to a much broader culture of care than had previously been the norm even within laboratories that had fully integrated veterinary care into their practice. The difference was stark. Animals could now suffer in the absence of physiological pain. Whether or not an animal was physiologically capable of feeling pain, one had to consider the behavioural, mental and social needs of the species. As such, the NIH unintentionally empowered an alternative and to some degree radical culture of animal care which subsequently took centre stage triggering the reform of the Animal Welfare Act 1966. Fox went on to emphasise that the problem was more than the fact that Taub had failed to meet the expected animal welfare standards of the day. The critical issue was that Taub had underestimated the degree to which failure to provide for the natural, social, mental and behavioural needs of the Silver Spring monkeys would have corrupted his experimental data. Fox outlined a broad culture of care that made scientific knowledge dependent on the promotion of animal welfare in the widest sense. Left unsaid, but implicit to the congressional inquiry, was that millions of federal dollars had been funnelled to Taub and others via the NIH and if Fox was to be believed the scientific data produced must be judged as less than reliable. 72 69 The use of animals, 1. 70 For his defence of anthropomorphism see Michael Fox, Laboratory Animal Husbandry: Ethology, Welfare, and Experimental Variables (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986), 182. 71 The use of animals, 48. 72 The animal rights advocate Henry Spira gave more explicit testimony on economic implications asserting "this subcommittee has an almost unique opportunity of doing what is good for the public, for the lab animals, and for the productive science while saving taxpayers' dollars" (The use of animals, 277).
Fox's argument was distinct from historical antivivisectionist criticism which the congressional hearing would have been more than familiar with. Fox was not presenting a moral argument against the corruptive evils of cruelty to animals. Instead, Fox made the needs of experimental science dependent on those of animal welfare advocating for a culture of care where all aspects of animal wellbeing served as guarantors of reliable science. Moreover, he mobilised science to argue for legislative reform. The 1966 Animal Welfare Act had established "provisions for the physical requirements of laboratory animals" yet recent advances in ethology and laboratory animal science had shown that:
Deprivation of social and environmental needs of primates and of other laboratory animals housed in cages often in social isolation and without sufficient freed of movement can be as bad in terms of the animal's welfare and the validity of experimentation as depriving it of adequate nutrition. 73
Safeguarding animal welfare was "an ethical imperative as well as a scientific imperative because animals that are not optimally cared for will jeopardize scientific progress." 74 Even if Taub's monkeys could not feel physiological pain their self-mutilation was an indicator of stress. But it was equally a signal that cast doubt on the quality and validity of Taub's data. Fox and others had been advocating for the co-dependency of the quality of science and the promotion of animal welfare for over a decade. The Silver Spring monkeys provided a platform which, through virtue of its political and public character, brought the argument centre stage.
Conclusions
In the immediate years following the 1981 raid on his laboratory Taub endured three trials and an NIH investigation before clearing his name in 1984. He never returned to animal research. Instead, he embarked on what in many ways became an equally if not more successful research trajectory. Joining the University of Alabama-Birmingham in 1987 he applied what he learned with monkeys to the development of new treatments for human stroke victims. Taub revitalised approaches to rehabilitation after brain injury by demonstrating that what had been thought of as a physiological limit was in fact "learned non-use." 75 Clinical approaches to rehabilitation following brain injury assumed a fixed limit beyond which patients could regain no movement. This view derived from the belief in a static brain unable to adapt to damage. Working with monkeys had taught Taub that the brain was far more flexible than many believed. Having seen similar behaviours in his monkeys Taub was convinced that human patients simply gave up 73 Ibid., 186 74 Ibid., 189. the hard work of retraining the brain to use an affected limb. It was easier to compensate with the unaffected limb. Adapting Taub's experimental techniques to human patients involved constraining healthy limbs by force so as to compel consenting individuals to learn anew how to move nonresponsive limbs. The outcome, Constraint-Induced Movement Therapy, revealed the fallacy of existing approaches to rehabilitation as patients found they could relearn movement beyond the presumed physiological limit.
Constraint-Induced Movement Therapy was a powerful clinical application demonstrating a radical new understanding of the brain: neuroplasticity. The Silver Spring monkeys' final contribution to science was to provide substantive evidence base for the theory. By 1987 the controversy had evolved from arguments over what had been done to the animals in the name of science to the equally vexed question of what was to be done with them in the future. On the one side, scientific organisations including the Society for Neuroscience and the American Physiological Society had offered to raise an endowment to cover the cost of maintaining the animals for their remaining natural life spans. On the other, a coalition of animal advocacy groups, including PETA and led by Congress Representative Robert C. Smith, wished to purchase the animals in order to guarantee their freedom from science. In congress, 229 members co-sponsored a bill which, had it passed, would have ensured the Silver Springs monkeys be placed in a private animal sanctuary. An independent legal argument went all the way to the Supreme Court which ruled that animal advocacy groups' possessed no legal standing to intervene in the fate of the monkeys. As the debate over the future of the monkeys raged the NIH was underwriting the not insubstantial cost of maintaining the animals now temporarily relocated to the Delta Regional Primate Center in Louisiana. Eventually, the NIH negotiated a compromise where four of the healthier monkeys were rehomed at the San Diego Zoo whilst those deemed to be experiencing unacceptable suffering were euthanized and studied to ensure their deaths would not be in vain. The decision to euthanize was highly controversial. Congressman Smith accused the NIH of violating a commitment to conduct no further research on the animals. Pacheco claimed the NIH killed the animals because "they don't want animals out there who lived to tell their story -they don't want survivors." 76 Yet, the decision to euthanize and study those animals deemed unable to adapt to life in the zoo revealed a significant unintended consequence of the long-running controversy. The seizure and subsequent legal wrangling over the fate of the Silver Spring monkeys had prolonging the lifespan of unique animals whose brains had been deprived of sensory stimulation for an unprecedented length of time. Far longer than otherwise would have been the case. 77 When euthanized and studied in 1991 their brains showed widespread cortical reorganisation 76 
